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A Review of The New Financial Deal by David Skeel
I. INTRODUCTION
In The New Financial Deal: Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act
and Its (Unintended) Consequences,' Professor David Skeel undertakes
the harrowing task of both synthesizing and addressing the weaknesses
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank). 2 In clear, efficient, non-legal prose, Skeel provides a revisionist
history of the events leading up to the financial crisis of 2008, a
summary of the financial reforms of Dodd-Frank that emerged as a
result, a critical view of these reforms, and proposals for addressing
some of Dodd-Frank's shortcomings.
On the whole, Skeel is critical of the Dodd-Frank reforms and is
troubled by the destabilizing effects they may have on U.S. and global
capital markets. The New Financial Deal synthesizes its criticism of
Dodd-Frank into two prominent themes that emerge in the legislation:
(1) a corporatist approach to bank regulation that allows the government
to channel policy through partnership with large financial institutions;
and (2) an erosion of rule-of-law principles by expanding the discretion
of regulators in the event of financial crisis. These two developments,
in Skeel's view, greatly threaten the future of American finance.
However, Skeel's outlook is not entirely gloomy. For instance,
joining with a near unanimous chorus of academic voices, he finds the
provisions regarding the clearing and exchange trading of derivatives to
be an "unequivocal advance." 3  He also views the creation of the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or Bureau) as a positive
and potentially prominent counterweight to the political leverage of the
financial lobby.4  Yet, even these promising aspects of Dodd-Frank
depend greatly on effective implementation.
1. DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT
AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES (2011).
2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 11l-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
3. SKEEL, supra note 1, at 14.
4. See id at 14-15.
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This review of The New Financial Deal both summarizes and
analyzes some of Skeel's views on Dodd-Frank and their implications
for the future of bank regulation. Although Skeel accurately identifies
several problems with the Dodd-Frank regime and introduces a very
promising policy fix, his prediction for one of the regime's key prongs -
imposing more stringent capital requirements on systemically important
- 5financial institutions - has proven overly pessimistic.
II. A NEW NARRATIVE OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE "LEGISLATIVE
GRINDER"
A. Debunking the Lehman Myth
Skeel provides his own account and interpretation of the events
leading up to the financial crisis of 2008. Most notably, Skeel
adamantly rejects what he describes as the "Lehman Myth" - the view
that while the subprime crisis remained more or less manageable after
the bailout of Bear Steams, the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy filing on
September 15, 2008, set into motion a wave of consequences that nearly
brought down the U.S. and global economy.6 The Lehman Myth also
convinced many that bankruptcy was not an adequate framework for
handling the collapse of the largest financial institutions.
Skeel dismisses views derived from the Lehman Myth as
"almost completely wrong."8  Specifically, he dismisses accounts by
leading banking regulators that the Federal Reserve could not legally
lend to Lehman since they had very little acceptable collateral. 9 To
Skeel, this argument is spurious in light of the fact that regulators
"didn't hesitate to stretch the law when they bailed out Bear Steams and
AIG."91o
To further debunk the Lehman Myth, Skeel examines key
market indices to measure the true impact of Lehman's bankruptcy
filing.' 1  For instance, Skeel compares the daily market reactions
5. See infra Part V.C.
6. SKEEL, supra note 1, at 20-2 1.
7. See id. at 21.
8. Id at 22.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 23-26 (analyzing market data in reaction to the Lehman bankruptcy and
the AIG bailout).
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surrounding the news of Lehman's bankruptcy filing and the AIG
rescue package. 12 Daily changes in those indexes - the S&P 500, the
VIX' 3, and the TED spread1 4 - were virtually identical, indicating that
the reaction to the AIG news was equally forceful.15
Addressing the second component of the Lehman Myth, Skeel
attributes the perceived disorder of Lehman's bankruptcy to the spoiled
expectations of its leadership and observers that Lehman would either
receive government assistance or be acquired. As an indicator of these
expectations, Skeel points to the surprising lack of movement in the
spreads for credit default protection against default by Lehman prior to
the filing of its bankruptcy petition.16 Since government assistance was
expected, Lehman was left largely unprepared for its bankruptcy filing
on September 15, 2008.17 Estimates suggest that $50 to $75 billion of
value dissipated from Lehman's balance sheet as a result of its failure to
plan for bankruptcy.' 8
B. Legislative Background
Skeel expresses "no doubt that the one factor that contributed
more directly to the thinking of the architects of Dodd-Frank than any
other was the Lehman [M]yth."l 9 On the other hand, Skeel contends
that the backgrounds and personalities of Dodd-Frank's two primary
architects within the administration - Treasury Secretary Timothy
Geithner and Director of the National Economic Council Lawrence
Summers - weighed heavily in the Act's formulation and in the
legislative process. 20
In particular, the book suggests that two events in Geithner's
12. SKEEL, supra note 1, at 23.
13. Short for the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index, the VIX
measures market expectations for stock market volatility in the following thirty days. It is
often referred to as the "fear index" or the "fear gauge."
14. The TED spread measures the difference between interest rates on interbank loans
and short-term U.S. government debt. It is a key indicator of perceived credit risk and of the
health of the banking system.
15. SKEEL, supra note 1, at 23.
16. Id. at 28.
17. Id.
I8. Id
19. Id at 39.
20. See id at 43-44 ("[Geithner and Summers] won, leaving their stamp on financial
regulation for the next generation.").
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career seem to have influenced his approach to financial crisis response:
the Mexican currency crisis of 1994 and 1995, and the collapse of
Long-Term Capital Management in 1998. In these two interventions,
which were largely viewed as successes, Skeel argues that "Geithner
seems to have learned . .. that bailouts are the best response when a
large institution or country is in trouble."2 ' Skeel portrays Geithner's
counterpart and mentor, Lawrence Summers, not only as an intransigent
Washington elite with corporatist leanings, but also as one of the
administration's surprising advocates of the consumer protection agency
that would eventually become the CFPB.22
With these two personalities in place, The New Financial Deal
recounts the U.S. Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) March 2009
release of the outline that would eventually become the Dodd-Frank
legislation. Among the greatest challenges proponents faced was the
charge that the new resolution framework would institutionalize the
bailouts of 2008.
In buttressing his advocacy for bankruptcy reforms as a way to
improve the Dodd-Frank framework, Skeel attempts to explain how and
why a bankruptcy-based resolution alternative was ultimately set aside.
In Skeel's view, the administration's resistance to bankruptcy-centered
reforms was largely due to the persistence of the Lehman Myth and the
Treasury's (and Geithner's) "strong preference for regulatory rescues
and an equally strong aversion to bankruptcy." 23 Skeel suggests that
Congress didn't earnestly consider a bankruptcy alternative because
committee jurisdiction would have forced Representative Barney Frank
and Senator Christopher Dodd to relinquish their control over the
reform process.24 In other words, since bankruptcy legislation is the
province of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Senate Banking and
House Financial Services Committees would have lost their control over
the reform process. 25
Therefore, with bankruptcy off the table as a serious alternative,
lawmakers and the administration assuaged critics by making the
resolution proposal look less like a framework for bailouts. Subsequent
21. SKEEL, supra note 1, at 45.
22. Id. at 114.
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drafts of the legislation introduced the requirement that all financial
companies placed into receivership would be liquidated.26 Other
provisions were also added to ensure that the costs of resolution would
be borne by the financial services industry through assessments or by
disposition of the troubled firm's own assets.27
In the end, Skeel points to one event for giving Dodd-Frank
"irresistible momentum": 28 the April 19, 2010 announcement by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that it would sue Goldman
Sachs for failing to inform investors in a complex transaction that its
fund manager had taken positions against some of the transaction's
component securities.29 Within a matter of weeks of this
announcement, the Dodd Bill passed in the Senate and was set to be
reconciled with the Frank Bill in the House.30
III. VIEWS OF DODD-FRANK'S FINANCIAL REFORMS
The bulk of The New Financial Deal is an examination of the
major components of Dodd-Frank and the implications of these
components. Grouped into the major areas of reform, each chapter
provides a brief sketch of Dodd-Frank's prominent features before
proceeding to an analytical discussion.
A. Banking Reform
Skeel frames much of his criticism of Dodd-Frank by
contrasting two competing approaches to managing the risk of the
largest financial firms. One approach, which he calls the Brandeisian
tradition, advocates breakup and dispersion of the most dominant firms
to encourage competition. 31  The other approach, the corporatist
tradition, relies heavily on a partnership between large banks and
32
government. The New Financial Deal argues that the corporatist
tradition not only prevailed in the passage of Dodd-Frank, but that even
26. 12 U.S.C. § 5394(a) (Supp. IV 2010).
27. § 5394(b)-(c); SKEEL, supra note 1, at 54.
28. SKEEL, supra note 1, at 56.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 10.
32. Id. at 11.
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the Brandiesian concessions within Dodd-Frank will serve to solidify
the partnership between Washington and Wall Street.
Skeel begins his summary of the new banking regulation
framework with a discussion of the Financial Stability Oversight
Council (FSOC or the Council), a new regulatory body that, along with
the Federal Reserve, will oversee any commercial bank holding
company with over $50 billion in assets and any nonbank it designates
as "systemically important." 33  Such a designation for a nonbank
financial institution requires a two-thirds vote of the Council's
members.34 A court may overturn this designation only if it is deemed
"arbitrary and capricious."35
Ultimately, when a firm is designated as "systemically
important," the Federal Reserve will impose more stringent capital
requirements in order to limit the risk of its failure.36 Also, under what
is termed the Volcker Rule,37 commercial banks and their affiliates are
prohibited from engaging in proprietary trading and from holding an
ownership interest in a private equity or hedge fund. In his analysis of
these two new provisions, Skeel maintains that the partnership between
the government and dominant financial institutions "will be the defining
feature of the new financial order."38
1. Elevated Capital Standards
The New Financial Deal notes that Dodd-Frank's focus on
higher capital requirements represents a near-consensus of academic
opinion on how to rein in systemic risk in the financial system.3 9
However, Skeel raises two concerns with this approach. First, capital
requirements are difficult to calibrate effectively given the complexity
of banks' balance sheets.40  As an example, Skeel points to the
33. Id. at 78.
34. The Council is comprised of heads of the Federal Reserve, the SEC, the new
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the new Federal Insurance Office. SKEEL, supra
note 1, at 79.
35. Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (setting forth the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard).
36. SKEEL, supra note 1, at 79.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 82.
40. Id.
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breakdown of the "state-of-the-art" Basel II capital adequacy standards
as "an object lesson that the general enthusiasm for higher capital
requirements is misplaced if the requirements cannot be implemented
effectively."A' Second, Skeel worries that Dodd-Frank "provides only
limited instructions to the Federal Reserve for fulfilling its charge to
impose higher capital requirements on systemically important
institutions."42 As such, he predicts that since these capital
requirements will be negotiated out of the public spotlight, giant banks
will likely be able to lobby effectively to erode them.
2. The Volcker Rule: Proprietary Trading, Hedge Funds, and Private
Equity
The inclusion of the Volcker Rule, one of the most significant
tools for the regulation of systemically important institutions, arose as a
result of populist pressure.4 3 As noted above, the Volcker Rule prohibits
commercial banks from engaging in proprietary trading and restricts
their ability to own or sponsor hedge funds and private equity funds.44
By Dodd-Frank's definition, the Volcker Rule applies not only to
commercial banks, but also to any corporate entity that includes a
commercial bank as an affiliate.4 5
Although the reach of the Volcker Rule appears quite expansive,
Skeel argues that it is likely to be watered down for two primary
reasons. First, the book notes that the exclusions built into the Volcker
Rule - such as those permitting the trading of Treasury bills, market
making, hedging, and transactions made for customers - permits a great
degree of manipulation.4 6 For instance, Skeel predicts that proprietary
trading units will simply migrate to desks that trade for company
clients.47 As such, proprietary trading units will continue conducting
the same business as before, but under the guise of client transactions.
Skeel's second concern relates to the "de minimis" exception to
the Volcker Rule which allows a bank to own up to three percent of an
41. Id. at 83.
42. SKEEL, supra note 1, at 83.
43. Id. at 85.
44. Id
45. Id. at 87.
46. Id. at 88.
47. Id.
4412012]
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otherwise prohibited hedge fund or private equity fund so long as that
interest does not exceed three percent of the bank's core capital.48
Specifically, he believes that this exception effectively preserves the
status quo since "most banks will be able to fit within the [three] percent
limitation without any significant shedding of assets." 49
In sum, since these Brandeisian concessions rely so heavily on
the discretion of regulators, they are unlikely to force any meaningful
downsizing in the largest financial institutions. On the contrary, the
discretion in afforded implementation and enforcement of these
provisions will in fact solidify a partnership between systemically
important financial institutions and regulators - a partnership in which
government will promote its political objectives. Pointing to the Obama
administration's inclusion of energy efficiency incentives in the terms
of the Chrysler bankruptcy,50 Skeel concludes that "Dodd-Frank not
only invites [the] mixing of political and economic objectives; it
* ,,51positively encourages it . . ..
B. Derivatives Reform
Recognizing the negative connotation recently attached to the
phrase "financial innovation," The New Financial Deal is careful to
explain how derivatives differ from other financial instruments. After
summarizing the new exchange trading and clearing requirement, the
book provides an on-the-fly history of derivatives regulation - from the
establishment of the Chicago Board of Trade through the Commodities
Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA). For Skeel, the CFMA had
two major consequences: (1) it secured a huge source of profits for
dealer banks; and (2) it exacerbated the crisis by virtue of the opacity of
the derivatives market. 52
48. SKEEL, supra note 1, at 88.
49. Id.
50. While Fiat was initially given a twenty percent stake in Chrysler, the deal terms
allowed Fiat to increase its ownership stake in Chrysler by fifteen percent for free provided,
among other things, that it helped Chrysler produce a more fuel-efficient car and market it
outside of the United States. In January 2012, Fiat officially fulfilled this requirement and
increased its ownership stake accordingly. Jeff Bennett & Gilles Castonguay, Fiat Increases
Ownership in Chrysler to 58.5%, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203513604577141651251660594.html.
51. SKEEL, supra note 1, at 93.
52. Id. at 65-66.
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Skeel portrays the derivatives reform component of Dodd-Frank
as "sweeping ... yet uncontroversial."53  The new framework will
honor the existing regulatory jurisdiction of the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) and the SEC. The SEC will regulate
trading of security-based swaps, and the CFTC will regulate trading of
all other categories of swaps.54  The new framework now divides
derivatives market participants into two categories: swap dealers55 and
major swap participants.56 Beyond these designations, the new regime's
requirements are fairly straightforward. When regulators order a swap
to be cleared, it must be cleared by a clearinghouse and traded on an
exchange.
Although the general requirements appear somewhat
uncomplicated, Skeel aptly points out some of the concerns and
dilemmas that the new framework engenders. For instance, since dealer
banks earn substantial fees from individually tailored contracts, they
stand to gain by persuading regulators that exchange trading and
clearing is not necessary for certain types of new derivatives.5 8 Dealer
banks are also capable of limiting migration to exchanges and
clearinghouses by creating derivatives that are highly complex and
difficult to standardize. 9
Furthermore, the concentration of risk in the derivatives market
will simply shift depending on how the market for clearinghouses
develops.60 Whereas the emergence of a few dominant clearinghouses
creates an enormous concentration of risk, a market of many dispersed
clearinghouses could encourage a race to the bottom, similar to the
oversight failures experienced in the credit rating market.
Ultimately, Skeel believes that "a large majority of derivatives
will find their way to clearinghouses and exchanges within a few
53. Id. at 66.
54. Id. at 68.
55. Skeel predicts that the category of dealers will likely include major dealer banks
such as Bank of America, Barclays, JP Morgan and several others. Id
56. A major swap participant is any firm that "maintains a substantial position" in the
swaps market but excludes hedging transactions. 15 U.S.C. § 8321 (Supp. IV 2010)
(amending Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § la(33) (2006)).
57. Designated by Dodd-Frank as a "swap execution facility." id.
58. SKEEL, supra note 1, at 69-70.
59. Id. at 70.
60. Id. at 69.
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years"61 and that a concentrated market of clearinghouses is a more
likely and preferable scenario. 62 The New Financial Deal suggests that
like many of the provisions of Dodd-Frank, prospects for the success of
the new derivatives framework "comes down to the regulators." 63 If too
few derivatives products are corralled into the exchange/clearing
framework or if dangerous incentives develop in the clearinghouse
industry, one of the more promising contributions of Dodd-Frank will
be substantially undermined.
C. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
The New Financial Deal portrays the creation of the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau as a story of "unexpected triumph."64
Before summarizing the new Bureau's charge, Skeel delves into the
Bureau's unlikely roots: the writings of the leading consumer finance
scholar, Elizabeth Warren. 65  Though the Bureau's launch was
somewhat precarious, Skeel is hopeful that it will become a
"meaningful counterweight" to the influence of systemically important
banks. 66
Defying widespread predictions that the CFPB would not
survive the legislative process, the Bureau emerged with "more clout
and independence than anyone imagined possible."67 Although it is a
bureau within the Federal Reserve, the CFPB operates independently.
The President, with consent of the Senate, appoints its director for a
five-year term.68 The CFPB director is a voting member of the FSOC.69
The CFPB is charged with overseeing markets for consumer financial
products and services, such as mortgages, credit cards, and payday
lending. 70 Within these realms, the Bureau's powers are broad and
formidable. A rule promulgated by the Bureau may be set aside by
other regulators only by a two-thirds vote of the FSOC and a
61. Id. at 70.
62. Id. at 71.
63. Id. at 75.
64. SKEEL, supra note 1, at 99.
65. Id. at 102.
66. Id.
67. Id at 99.
68. Id at 101.
69. Id. at 100.
70. SKEEL, supra note 1, at 101.
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determination that the rule presents systemic risk concerns."
The author stresses that the long-term success of the CFPB "will
depend heavily on whether it quickly establishes itself as a significant
regulatory player." 72 Using the mixed history of success by the SEC as
an example, Skeel suggests that the enthusiasm that Warren brings to
the Bureau may not last. At very least, the Bureau will confront its
first significant roadblock in 2014 when funding guaranteed by Dodd-
Frank ceases.74
Skeel also echoes some common concerns regarding the CFPB:
that the CFPB's oversight could both stunt innovation and decrease the
availability of consumer credit.7 5 Nevertheless, Skeel maintains that
although it is impossible to know whether these concerns will actually
materialize, more stringent oversight of the consumer credit market is
necessary.76 Most importantly, he argues that the CFPB "runs counter
to Dodd-Frank's endorsement of the biggest financial
institutions ... ."77 As an appreciably stronger advocate of consumer
rights, the CFPB will be able to rein in the abusive credit practices of
large banks.
D. A New Resolution Framework for Systemically Important
Financial Institutions
1. Spotlight on the FDIC
The extension of the FDIC's resolution framework to
systemically important financial institutions has been promoted as the
solution for ending bailouts. However, before beginning a detailed
discussion of the new resolution framework for large financial
institutions, Skeel questions many of its underlying justifications.
Specifically, he inquires whether the FDIC really occupies the same role
in this new regime and if its framework was actually as effective as it
was portrayed.
71. Id
72. Id. at 111.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 112.
75. Id. at 113.
76. SKEEL, supra note 1, at 113
77. Id. at 114.
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Skeel explains that for much of the FDIC's eighty-year history,
very few banks failed and the agency had little to do.78 The first real
challenge came in the 1980s during the savings and loan crisis.
Although the FDIC had little to do with the regulation of savings and
loan institutions, the crisis drew attention to a regulatory flaw that led to
the enactment of two laws 79 that bolstered the FDIC's resolution
powers. This post-1991 resolution framework gave the FDIC the
authority to close a bank unilaterally - a power it did not previously
have.so
Furthermore, Skeel argues that the FDIC resolution framework
is not well suited for what it is asked to do. In particular, the FDIC
resolution practice has been tailored to the profile of deposit-taking
commercial banks.8 ' While the FDIC's handling of ordinary bank
failures has varied, it has "struggled mightily in nearly all of its larger
cases."82 As examples, Skeel points to the FDIC's delay in closing
IndyMac and its failed attempt to resolve Wachovia.83  In his view,
"[t]he new resolution regime .... extends FDIC oversight to precisely
the kinds of financial institutions the FDIC has been least effective in
handling." 84
2. The New Resolution Authority
Before assessing the prospects for the new resolution regime,
also termed the "orderly liquidation authority," Skeel provides a
summary of the new regime's key features. First, as mentioned above, a
resolution begins when, after consultation with the President, the
Treasury recommends a takeover and both the Federal Reserve Board
78. Id. at 119.
79. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (amending the Federal Deposit Insurance Act at 12
U.S.C. § 1811 et seq.); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (amending the Federal Deposit Insurance Act at
12 U.S.C. § 1811 et seq.). Under FIRREA, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation was abolished and its responsibilities were transferred to the FDIC. 12 U.S.C. §
1437 (2006).
80. FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(10).
81. See SKEEL, supra note 1, at 125.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 126.
[Vol. 16446
THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL
and the FDIC concur by a two-thirds vote.85 Though designed primarily
to wind down systemically important institutions, the resolution
framework permits regulators to take over any financial institution
whose failure they believe would have a destabilizing effect.
Challenging a decision to step in will be very difficult. If
managers of the troubled financial institution do not consent to a
resolution, regulators can simply file a petition in federal court claiming
that the financial institution in question is in default or in imminent
danger of default.8 6 The court is given twenty-four hours to make its
ruling, and it may only reject the petition if it finds it is "arbitrary and
capricious."87 As receiver, the FDIC is permitted to sell the institution
or any of its parts. With the exception of the contracts that the FDIC
chooses to honor, creditors of the financial institution will ordinarily
take losses.88  The goal is to liquidate the company in an orderly
manner.
To assess whether this new resolution framework will in fact
end taxpayer bailouts, Skeel lays out four key objectives that he finds
critical for any insolvency framework: (1) that it be initiated in a timely
fashion; (2) that it limit the damaging effect of financial distress on third
parties; (3) that shareholders and creditors not be paid in full if the
company is insolvent; and (4) that the regime protect as much of the
value of the company's assets as possible. Ultimately, Skeel finds that
the Dodd-Frank resolution framework fails to achieve three of these
four key objectives.
3. Timeliness
First, The New Financial Deal argues that despite the
considerable discretion afforded to bank regulators, they will
nevertheless seek to postpone a resolution as much as possible.90
Instead, Skeel predicts that the Federal Reserve will more likely respond
by fashioning a broad-based lending program meant to prop up the
85. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5382-5383 (Supp. IV 2010); SKEEL, supra note 1, at 130.
86. SKEEL, supra note 1, at 131.
87. 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iii).
88. SKEEL, supra note 1, at 131.
89. Id. at 131-32.
90. Id. at 139.
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troubled institution.91  Furthermore, "even if regulators wanted to
intervene in a timely fashion, the complexity of the nation's largest
financial institutions is sufficiently great that they are not likely to know
until late in a company's decline that the time has come." 92 At the same
time, bank managers, the individuals with the best information
regarding a company's true condition, have every incentive to delay
intervention or seek a bailout.93 Since neither regulators nor managers
will be eager to invoke the new resolution framework, timely
intervention appears unlikely.
4. Controlling Systemic Risk
With reservations, Skeel believes that controlling systemic risk
"is indeed the one thing Dodd-Frank may do tolerably well."94
Underlying Dodd-Frank's approach to controlling systemic risk is a
special set of rules for qualified financial contracts and the FDIC's
enormous power of the purse.95
First, ipso facto clauses in derivatives contracts - those dictating
that initiation of insolvency proceeding constitute an event of default -
are unenforceable for one business day under the new Dodd-Frank
regime. 96  For both individual and master agreements with
counterparties of the troubled institution, the FDIC must either
repudiate all of the contracts or none of them.97  Also, to fund its
intervention, the FDIC may have the Treasury issue debt obligations up
to an amount equal to ten percent of the value of the company's pre-
resolution assets.98 This borrowing is entitled to priority, and any costs
not covered in the resolution proceeding will be paid from an Orderly
91. Between March and November 2008, the Federal Reserve exercised its authority
under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. § 343) to create six new lending
facilities to promote overall market liquidity. To refocus the Federal Reserve's section
13(3) authority, Dodd-Frank explicitly prohibits lending programs that are intended to "aid a
failing financial company." 12 U.S.C. § 343(a)(6) (Supp. IV 2010).
92. SKEEL, supra note 1, at 140.
93. Id. at 140-41.
94. Id. at 142.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 142.
98. SKEEL, supra note 1, at 144.
448 [Vol. 16
THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL
Liquidation Fund, funded by assessments imposed on other systemically
important institutions.99
Ultimately, Skeel concludes that the new framework still leaves
open the possibility of bailouts outside the resolution process that would
carry the same negative effects.
5. Consistent Haircuts
The New Financial Deal maintains that any effective insolvency
regime must honor the absolute priority rule, a core bankruptcy
principle that guarantees that the claims of certain creditors must be
satisfied in full before other creditors receive payments.'00 Although
Dodd-Frank incorporates promising elements of bankruptcy law and
explicitly announces its intention to force shareholder and creditor
haircuts, Skeel fears that the enormous discretion afforded to the FDIC
will allow it to evade these requirements fairly easily.o'0 For Skeel, the
wide discretion given to the FDIC greatly erodes the rule of law
principles that define an effective insolvency regime.
6. Preservation of Enterprise Value and Liquidation
Finally, Skeel assesses how well-equipped Dodd-Frank's
resolution regime is to protect the value of insolvent financial
institutions. First, Skeel points out that the FDIC's common strategy for
closing small and medium sized banks - finding a buyer to assume the
banks' assets - is more difficult, if not impossible, in the context of the
largest banks and nonbank financial institutions.102 He reminds us that a
successful assumption by a large financial institution will likely "make
a financial giant even bigger." 0 3
Furthermore, Skeel argues that by confining the FDIC's
resolution options to liquidation, the FDIC is ill-equipped to preserve a
troubled company's value and that this will undermine competition in
the financial services industry.104 In a market of few or no potential
99. Id. at 145.
100. Id. at 144-45.
101. Id. at 148.
102. Id at 148-49.
103. Id at 149.
104. SKEEL, supra note 1, at 150.
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buyers, restructuring may be highly preferable to a receivership
approach.
IV. SKEEL'S RECOMMENDATIONS
Though Skeel describes the Dodd-Frank resolution framework
as "a mess," he is hopeful that it can be salvaged. 0 5 Recognizing that
there is likely no possibility of reversing the key elements of the new
regulatory regime, Skeel is confident that small adjustments can be
made to remedy some of its flaws.106 In particular, he argues that "the
most serious problems can be fixed through simple adjustments to the
ordinary bankruptcy laws to encourage troubled companies to initiate
voluntary proceedings in the event of a crisis."' 0 7
In formulating these adjustments, Skeel emphasizes the
importance of reducing the role of regulators in the new regime,
engaging the "superior knowledge" of private parties, and reinforcing
predictable, rule-based principles.'0 8
A. Staying Derivatives in Bankruptcy Proceedings
Skeel's first proposed reform would eliminate the special
treatment that is afforded to derivatives and other financial instruments
in bankruptcy.109 Beyond enjoying a largely self-regulated derivatives
market for many years, derivatives creditors have also been exempt
from key bankruptcy rules such as the prohibition on enforcement of
ipso facto clauses, the provisions for preferences and fraudulent
conveyances, and most importantly, the automatic stay."10
For context and support, Skeel looks back to how the fear of
fallout in the derivatives market fueled enormous systemic risk
concerns."' Namely, regulators from across the board feared that the
termination of hundreds of thousands of derivatives contracts upon the
bankruptcy filing of an institution like AIG would itself spark a
105. Id. at 152.
106. Id. at 155-56.
107. Id. at 152.
108. Id. at 158.
109. Id.
110. SKEEL, supra note 1, at 158-59.
111. Id. at 160-61.
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systemic crisis.112  As a solution, Skeel believes that "[t]reating
derivatives the same way as other contracts would give the managers of
troubled financial institutions much greater incentives to make adequate
preparation for insolvency proceedings, and to use bankruptcy rather
than the Dodd-Frank resolution regime.",3
Furthermore, in the market for derivatives and repo lending,
which is extremely volatile, bank counterparties are much less inclined
to limit their exposure to a troubled institution if they know they would
be permitted to grab collateral at the first sign of distress. Repos and
derivatives have become increasingly popular specifically because of
this preferential treatment in bankruptcy.1 4 Skeel argues that subjecting
derivatives and repos to these core bankruptcy principles would reduce
the bias towards these types of volatile financing instruments and
encourage derivatives creditors to more closely monitor and to disperse
their exposure to a faltering institution.115  Moreover, as the new
clearing requirement for derivatives takes hold and clearinghouses serve
as backstops for a bank's performance, the special treatment of
derivatives and repos in bankruptcy will become unnecessary.
Skeel insists that the most dramatic changes would emerge for
the managers of systemically important financial institutions.116 For
managers, bankruptcy would become a much more attractive option as
the institution approaches insolvency. The temporary safe haven of the
automatic stay as well as the ability to recover preferential conveyances
would allow managers to resist the onerous margin call requirements
that pushed AIG to the brink in 2008.' 17 If bankruptcy were a more
attractive option, the managers of a faltering financial institution would
be ensured a role in the institution's future and would be more inclined
to plan for bankruptcy." 8
Nevertheless, Skeel responds to two natural concerns that arise
in connection with highly volatile markets such as derivatives. The first
concern is that for derivative counterparties with sizeable hedging
positions, the prospect of having to enter into replacement contracts - in
112. Id. at 160.
113. Id. at 158.
114. Id at 161.
115. Id. at 162.
116. SKEEL, supra note 1, at 162.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 163.
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the event of the imposition of a stay - appears unrealistic.119 The
second concern is that the volatility of derivatives contracts is such that
their value can change drastically in a short period of time.120 In other
words, holding up the resolution of these extremely short-term and
volatile contracts could have disastrous consequences. To address these
concerns, Skeel suggests that creditors can generally diminish these
risks by demanding adequate collateral and taking several smaller
derivatives positions with several banks rather than a larger position
with a single institution.12 1 He also advocates limiting the duration of
the automatic stay to three days, a period slightly longer than the one-
plus business day permitted 22 in the Dodd-Frank resolution
framework.123
Ultimately, Skeel is confident that "if the special treatment of
derivatives were reversed, the Dodd-Frank resolution regime would
rarely, if ever, be necessary." 24 By making bankruptcy a more viable
option for systemically important financial firms, Skeel believes that
procedural fairness, transparency, and rule of law principles can be
restored to our insolvency laws.
B. International Solutions
For large financial institutions with an international presence,
insolvency proceedings are governed by the varying rules of each
country.125 Citing the messy nature of insolvency proceedings and the
global span of the recent crisis, Skeel criticizes how little Dodd-Frank
has contributed in this area.126 Dodd-Frank addresses the international
aspects of financial regulation by encouraging cooperation with foreign
regulators, banning brokers and derivatives traders from trading in the
United States if their country's regulation threatens the stability of U.S.
119. Id. at 164.
120. Id. at 164-65.
121. Id. at 165.
122. For example, ispo facto clauses are stayed from the moment the receivership
commences until 5:00 PM the following business day. 12 U.S.C. § 5390(c)(10)(B) (Supp.
IV 2010).
123. SKEEL, supra note 1, at 166.
124. Id. at 163.
125. Id. at 176.
126. Id.
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markets, and requiring a living will for rapid and orderly resolution in
the event of an institution's failure. 127
First, Skeel notes that beyond general pleas encouraging
cooperation with foreign regulators, Dodd-Frank authorizes the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board to exchange information with
foreign regulators in the event of an international bank's insolvency.128
While the book notes that these provisions can "hardly be described as a
dynamic new strategy,"129 they do much in facilitating communication
with regulators in foreign proceedings. 130 Skeel also recognizes that
while the threat of banning brokers indicates a desire to protect the
United States from financial instability, the threat's real objective is to
address the risk that derivatives operations will move offshore.1 31 Skeel
senses a "whiff of desperation"l 32 in this strategy and doubts that U.S.
regulators will actually follow through with this threat. Lastly, Skeel
considers the living will requirement to be the "one genuine advance" 33
in the field of cross-border financial regulation. Implying that it is more
of a procedural disclosure obligation, Skeel is hopeful that the living
will requirement will encourage managers and directors to simplify their
capital structures.134  In turn, these simplified institutions would be
easier for regulators to monitor.
Conceding that sovereignty interests make a truly
comprehensive international insolvency framework impossible, Skeel
suggests that a "gradual, partial convergence of regulation around the
world is quite possible and might help."' To achieve this, Skeel
recommends that an explicit treaty of even limited signatories could
clear up some of the most significant issues that arise in cross-border
insolvencies, namely cash management and settlement problems.136
Since much of the world's financial activity is concentrated in a handful
of countries, even a limited treaty could be remarkably beneficial.
127. Id.
128. Id at 177.
129. SKEEL, supra note 1, at 184.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 185.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 185-86.
135. SKEEL, supra note 1, at 186.
136. Id. at 187.
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V. ASSESSING SKEEL'S ARGUMENTS
Since this review benefits from roughly a year of developments
since the book's publication, it also benefits from the ability to evaluate
Skeel's predictions. First, The New Financial Deal's primary policy
proposal - to remove special treatment for derivatives creditors in
bankruptcy - is remarkably persuasive and appears to have gained
traction in policy circles. The book has also proven remarkably
poignant in its emphasis on the point that much of Dodd-Frank's
success will depend on how effectively regulators lay out and enforce
new rules. However, Skeel's gloomy prediction for Dodd-Frank's new
capital adequacy regime has proven largely untrue.
A. Treatment of Derivatives Contracts in Bankruptcy
Stated differently, Skeel's most prominent policy
recommendation is somewhat elusive: the potential harm of the Dodd-
Frank resolution regime can be mitigated by making a different
alternative more attractive. Nevertheless, Skeel's proposal appeals to
common sense and is compelling in light of the inherent systemic risks
of derivatives markets.
First, removal of the special treatment of derivatives would treat
like transactions similarly and would place creditors in an even position
in the event of default. Since repo agreements are essentially a form of
short-term secured lending, creditors in these agreements should be
treated no differently than other secured creditors in bankruptcy. These
special exemptions essentially elevate the status of certain forms of
financing in bankruptcy without a convincing reason to do so.
Furthermore, in addition to diminishing the incentive for
creditors to monitor a troubled financial institution, the derivatives safe
harbor provision also exacerbates systemic risk by permitting runs on
the institution's assets. In truth, the systemic risk concerns surrounding
special treatment of derivatives in bankruptcy should have been
considered much sooner and with much more sincerity. When the
Federal Reserve intervened in response to the collapse of Long-Term
Capital Management in 1998, officials feared that a rush of more than
seventy-five counterparties to terminate hundreds of billions of dollars
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of derivatives contracts would have tipped off a systemic shock.m3 The
removal of the derivatives safe harbor would permit firms to resist
collateral grabs both before and after the filing of a bankruptcy petition.
Notwithstanding staunch opposition from influential interest
groups such as the International Swap and Derivatives Association,13 8
Skeel's proposal appears to be gaining traction among policymakers and
insolvency experts.139 The proposal was examined at length in a July
2011 Federal Reserve report on the efficacy of the Bankruptcy Code for
the resolution of financial companies.14 0 Though the study maintains a
neutral viewpoint, it states that the proposal to remove the derivatives
safe harbor "form[s] a foundation for consideration and exploration" of
further legislative reform.141
Perhaps the strongest sign of support for Skeel's proposal has
come from the FDIC itself. In a December 2011 interview, FDIC
General Counsel, Michael H. Krimminger, voiced his support for
making "improvements to the Bankruptcy Code to make it much more
likely we would never have to use the last option of a Title II
resolution." 42  Krinminger envisions that such improvements to the
Bankruptcy Code should provide for at least a brief delay in terminating
and netting of derivatives contracts.14 3  Echoing Skeel's arguments,
Krimminger believes that if the derivatives safe harbor were modified,
137. Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy
Code: Why the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. REG. 91, 99 (2005).
138. See DAVID MENGLE, ISDA RESEARCH NOTES: THE IMPORTANCE OF CLOSE-OUT
NETTING (2010), available at http://www.isda.org/researchnotes/pdf/Netting-
ISDAResearchNotes-1-20 1 0.pdf.
139. See generally Stephen J. Lubben, Derivatives Still Special After Overhaul, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 2, 2011, 1:30 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/11/02/derivatives-still-special-after-overhaul; Mark J.
Roe, Bankruptcy's Financial Crisis Accelerator: The Derivatives Players' Priorities in
Chapter 11, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2011); Stephen J. Lubben, Chapter 11 at the
Crossroads: Does Reorganization Need Reform?: Repeal the Safe Harbors, 18 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REv. 319, 319-36 (2009).
140. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., STUDY ON THE RESOLUTION OF
FINANCIAL COMPANIES UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE (1999), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/other-reports/files/bankruptcy-financial-study-
201107.pdf. Section 216(a) of Dodd-Frank directed the Federal Reserve Board to conduct
this study regarding the resolution of financial companies under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 216, 124 Stat. 1376, 1519 (2010).
141. Id. at 21.
142. R. Christian Bruce, Krimminger's List: A Little More Chapter 11, A Little Less
Title II, BANKING DAILY (BNA), Dec. 13, 2011.
143. Id.
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troubled firms "would likely be able to retain value for those valuable
contracts and sell them in the marketplace as part of the franchise sale
of the operations of the entity that's gone into bankruptcy . . . This will
recoup more value for creditors and help stabilize the market." 44
Ultimately, since the FDIC would nevertheless retain the ability
to pull the firm's bankruptcy petition and place it into resolution,145
implementation of Skeel's proposal would not hamper the FDIC's
efforts to exercise its orderly liquidation authority. If lawmakers really
intend to leave Chapter 11 open as an option for a distressed financial
institution, they should afford its managers the necessary tools, and
indeed the opportunity, to restructure the firm in a more transparent
manner.
B. Will Washington Answer the Call?
Skeel is correct in his view that Dodd-Frank left many of the
more meaningful reforms to be decided in the regulatory rulemaking
process out of public view. In other words, in negotiating some of the
Act's more technical points, regulators may fail in certain respects to
make Dodd-Frank the robust regulatory regime intended by Congress.
In no context has this proven more accurate than in the
implementation of the Volcker Rule. The proposed form of the Volcker
Rule released for notice and comment in October 2011146 occupied
nearly three hundred pages and was accompanied by more than 1,300
questions about 400 topics.147 Given the length of proposed rule, the
long list of questions, reports of persistent infighting among
regulators, 14 8 and the extension to the comment period, 149 some
144. Id.
145. 12 U.S.C. § 5384 (Supp. IV 2010).
146. The agency draft of the Volcker Rule can be accessed at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2011/34-65545.pdf, whereas the official proposed
Volcker Rule was published in Federal Register in November. Prohibition and Restrictions
on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and
Private Equity Funds, 68 Fed. Reg. 68,849 (Nov. 7, 2011), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-11-07/pdf/2011-27184.pdf.
147. James B. Steward, Volcker Rule, Once Simple, Now Boggles, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21,
2011, at Bl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/22/business/volcker-rule-grows-
from-simple-to complex.html?_r-1 &pagewanted=all.
148. Ben Protess, Volcker Rule Divides Regulators, N.Y. TIMEs DEALBOOK (Oct. 16,
2011, 9:48 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/volcker-rule-divides-regulators.
149. Cheyenne Hopkins, Regulators Extend Comment Period on Volcker Rule Proposal,
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observers doubt that regulators will be able to meet their July 2012
deadline.150  Initially envisioned as a relatively straightforward and
simple reform measure, 15 1 the Volcker Rule is now so lengthy and
complex that former FDIC chief Shiela Bair has urged regulators to
"think hard about starting over again[.]"l 52
More substantively, regulators essentially affirm Skeel's
concern with "the malleability of the term proprietary trading."1 53 In
the Volcker proposal, regulators concede that it is difficult to define
certain permitted activities because it "often involves subtle distinctions
that are difficult both to describe comprehensively within regulation and
to evaluate in practice."s 4 Specifically, the proposal admits that
"[a]lthough the purpose and function of [market making activities and
proprietary trading] are markedly different ... clearly distinguishing
these activities may be difficult in practice."15 5  Likewise, industry
participants complain that the lack of definitional bright lines will make
it difficult, if not impossible, for banks to comply.15 6  This lack of
clarity will also likely mean that regulators will have to enforce the
Volcker Rule's restriction on proprietary trading after transactions have
been completed.15 7  Others, such as banking and securities law expert,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 23, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-23/u-s-regulators-
delay-comment-period-on-volcker-rule-proposal.html.
150. Alexander Campbell, Volcker Rule Delays Likely As Opposition Grows, RISK.NET
(Nov. 25, 2011), http://www.risk.net/operational-risk-and-
regulation/news/2127777/volcker-rule-delays-opposition-grows.
151. Paul Volcker initially outlined the proposal for the rule in a three-page letter to
President Obama in 2009. See Steward, supra note 147.
152. Hopkins, supra note 149.
153. SKEEL, supra note 1, at 88.
154. Prohibition and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and
Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 68 Fed. Reg. 68,849 (Nov. 7,
2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-11-07/pdf/2011-27184.pdf
155. Id. at 53.
156. See, e.g., DELOITTE, THE VOLCKER RULE'S IMPACT ON INFRASTRUCTURE 2-3 (July
2011), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/FSI/US FSIThe%20Volcker%20Rule%E2%80
%99s%20impact%20on%20infrastructure_07141 1.pdf (noting that "[c]onstructing tests that
definitively delineate between [proprietary trading and permitted activities] may be quite
difficult" and that banks "will require robust infrastructure and processes to monitor and
comply."); Do Banks Face an Impossible Task Complying with the Volcker Rule?, AM.
BANKER, http://www.americanbanker.com/resource-center/?id=1044875.
157. See Client Alert, Bingham McCutchen LLP, Proposed Volcker Rule Regulations:
A Summary (Oct. 18, 2011), available at
http://www.bingham.com/ExtemalObjects/Docs/Client%2OAlert%20-
%20Volcker%2ORule%20Summary %286650%29.pdf (arguing that the proposal's lack of
clarity "rais[es] the potential danger of rule interpretation through enforcement.").
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Kimberley Kraweic, worry that the "disturbingly vague" definitions
contained in the proposal will allow banks to sidestep the rule.158 Like
Skeel, Krawiec predicts that banks will be able to effectively disguise
their proprietary trading volumes as trades executed for clients. 159
While Wall Street trading will face new restrictions under
Dodd-Frank, it will not likely be restricted to the extent envisioned by
Congress in the Volcker Rule. Given how slowly the rule-drafting
process has progressed and the fundamental difficulties regulators have
confronted in defining key terms, the Volcker Rule will likely be
watered down significantly.
C. Committed to Enhanced Capital Requirements
Lastly, in the time that has passed since the publication of The
New Financial Deal, Skeel's bleak prognosis for Dodd-Frank's new
capital adequacy regime has proven largely untrue. While he is
understandably skeptical in his belief that regulators may not follow
through on some of Dodd-Frank's directives, he is positively dismissive
of their ability to implement effective capital adequacy rules:
Perhaps the Fed will impose stringent capital
requirements that fully offset the advantages of financial
institutions that are perceived as too big to fail. But this
seems unlikely . . . . [These institutions can] argue that
higher capital requirements will dampen [their]
willingness to lend . . . . The likelihood that they will
emerge with favored status surely is a major reason that
the largest banks didn't squawk much as Dodd-Frank's
capital requirements and resolution regime were put in
place.160
As this passage demonstrates, Skeel focuses intently on the
attendant benefits of being designated a systemically important financial
158. Bonnie Kavoussi, Volcker Rule to Restrict Banks' Proprietary Trading Contains




160. SKEEL, supra note 1, at 83.
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institution under Dodd-Frank. Yet, despite the significant costs
associated with such a designation, The New Financial Deal largely
ignores the possibility that financial institutions would want to avoid it.
Overall, given the prominence of enhanced capital requirements
as a regulatory tool and the notable progress on efforts to implement
them, it is unconvincing to suggest that regulators will readily retreat
from them. Furthermore, preliminary estimates regarding the costs of
these measures indicate that they could be significant enough to erode
much of the funding advantages that the largest financial institutions
enjoy today.
1. Prominence and Progress
Enhanced capital requirements have been among the most
prominent strategies for reining in systemic risk since the beginning of
the debate surrounding financial reform. This proposal was included in
the original Treasury White Paper16 1 and in the Squam Lake Working
Papers162 outlining measures to strengthen regulation of financial
markets. Rather than retreating in the face of opposition from large
banks, federal regulators have instead proposed aggressive plans for a
capital surcharge on the largest financial institutions.'6 3  These
proposals have, in turn, galvanized industry opposition in the form of
new lobbying efforts and the commission of a comprehensive study
concerning the harmful effects of higher capital buffers. 64
Intent on cementing these strict capital surcharges, U.S.
regulators have also been strongly encouraged by their international
counterparts. Certainly due to the passage of time since The New
Financial Deal was published, the book makes no mention of Basel III,
161. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION
(2009), available at www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport-web.pdf.
162. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REFORMING CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2009).
163. Deborah Solomon and Victoria McGrane, Lenders Dig in on Rules, WALL ST. J.,
Jun. 16, 2011.
164. See Zach Dubinsky, U.S. to Adopt Carney's Tougher Banking Rules, CBCNEWS
(Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/story/2011/12/19/biz-us-basel-iii-capital-
surcharge-camey.html (citing "a concerted campaign by some top U.S. bank executives who
branded the rules 'anti-American."'); THE CLEARING HOUSE Ass'N, How MUCH CAPITAL IS
ENOUGH? CAPITAL LEVELS AND G-SIB CAPITAL SURCHARGES (2011), available at
http://www.theclearinghouse.org/index.html?f-072896.
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the new global regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy.' 65
Through the course of Basel III negotiations, a global regulatory
consensus has emerged in favor of imposing capital surcharges on the
largest and most interconnected financial institutions.' 66  As such, in
November 2011 global regulators agreed to impose capital surcharges
ranging from 1 to 2.5 percent of risk-weighted assets on twenty-nine of
world's largest financial firms.' 67  In December 2011, the Federal
Reserve responded with new proposed capital surcharge rules that
correspond to those set forth by the Basel Committee.168 Indeed, the
Federal Reserve's decision to accept the Basel capital adequacy
framework has been deemed "a defeat for giant U.S. banks."' 69
Underlying much of the global push toward more stringent
capital requirements is the contention that the social benefit of reducing
the risk of financial crisis far outweighs any temporary impairment to
economic growth. On the whole, regulators have dismissed arguments
that elevated capital requirements will decrease the availability of credit
and crimp the ability of banks to aid growth. As Skeel admits, several
studies have found that higher capital standards have a very limited
effect on the cost or availability of credit. 170  In a macroeconomic
165. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL III:
A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BAKING SYSTEMS
(2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl89.pdf.
166. See FIN. STABILITY BD., REDUCING THE MORAL HAZARD OF SYSTEMICALLY
IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2010), available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r10111 1a.pdf.
167. Daniel Flynn, G20 Names 29 Banks for Capital Surcharge, Recovery Plan,
REUTERS (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/04/g20-financials-
idUSL6E7M430120111104.
168. Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirement for Covered
Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 594 (Jan. 5, 2012); see also Shahien Nasiripour, Fed Proposes
New Bank Capital Rules, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2011,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/107db944-2b3e-11 el-9fdO-
00144feabdcO.html#axzzlm67bZor3 (noting that the proposed rules were an "expected
move that mirrors proposals by [the Basel Committee].").
169. Victoria McGrane & Dan Fitzpatrick, U.S. Banks Lose Battle of 'Basel', WALL ST.
J., Dec. 19, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020405840457710664368
9193010.html.
170. See DOUGLAS J. ELLIOTT, THE BROOKINGS INST.,
A FURTHER EXPLORATION OF BANK CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS: EFFECTS OF COMPETITION FRO
M OTHER FINANCIAL SECTORS AND EFFECTS OF SIZE OF BANK OR BORROWER AND OF LOAN
TYPE 2 (2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/-/media/664E1AD0493
E4C77B 178A60FA294773.pdf ("[C]apital levels could be raised quite substantially
without a large effect on bank loan pricing or availability"); JOSE M. BERROSPIDE &
ROCHELLE M. EDGE, FED. RESERVE BD., THE EFFECTS OF BANK CAPITAL ON LENDING: WHAT
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context, a recent joint study by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision and the Financial Stability Board estimated that imposing
an additional one percent capital surcharge on the thirty largest banks
over eight years would only cut economic growth by about .01% a
year. 7 1  One commentator suggests that the leveling effect of these
capital surcharges could even encourage competition and boost
economic growth. 172
In a June 2011 speech, Federal Reserve Board Governor Daniel
Tarullo referred to capital regulation as "the [most supple and] dynamic
tool we have to keep pace with the shifting sources of risk taken by
financial firms." Not only have enhanced capital standards been a
fundamental prong in the financial reform agenda, their efficacy is
supported by substantial empirical evidence. Although U.S. regulators
will certainly face a significant challenge in handling the convergence
of U.S. and international regulations, support for a capital surcharge on
systemically important financial institutions has reached a critical mass.
2. The Cost of Being "Systemically Important"
Without doubt, the funding and borrowing cost advantages that
come from being viewed as too big to fail are significant, and Skeel
cites figures indicating that these advantages have only increased since
the crisis.174 While these enhanced capital requirements aim to reduce
systemic risk in the global financial system,175 the Federal Reserve has
Do WE KNOW, AND WHAT DOES IT MEAN? 29 (2010), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201044/201044pap.pdf ("[O]ur empirical
results suggest relatively modest effects of both capital shortfalls and capital ratios on loan
growth .... ).
171. Regulators Defend Higher Bank Capital Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2011, at B11.
172. Daniel Indiviglio, Is JPMorgan's Dimon Right-Are New Bank Capital Rules
'Anti-American'?, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 12, 2011),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/09/is-jpmorgans-dimon-right-are-new-
bank-capital-rules-anti-american/244928.
173. Daniel K. Tarullo, Speech Before the Peterson Institute for International
Economics: Regulating Systemically Significant Financial Firms (June 3, 2011), available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20110603a.htm.
174. SKEEL, supra note 1, at 81; inci Otker-Robe et al., The Too-important-to-Fail
Conundrum: Impossible to Ignore and Difficult to Resolve, INT'L MONETARY FUND, 6 (May
27, 2011), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2011/sdn1112.pdf.
175. Specifically, Dodd-Frank directs regulators to "develop capital requirements ...
that address the risks that the activities of such institutions pose, not only to the institution
engaging in the activity, but to other public and private stakeholders in the event of adverse
performance, disruption, or failure of the institution or the activity." 12 U.S.C. § 5371
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been explicit in its desire to use them to "offset any implicit subsidy
[that banks enjoy] as a result of market perception of implicit
government support." 76  Since the publication of The New Financial
Deal, the costs that systemically important banks will incur as a result
of these capital surcharges have become increasingly clear.
For instance, Glenn Schorr, of Nomura Securities, quantified the
potential impact of the new capital surcharges on J.P. Morgan and Bank
of America.177 He concludes that the capital surcharge for J.P. Morgan
and Bank of America - as compared to other institutions not designated
as systemically-important - will equal roughly $11.1 and $12.5 billion,
respectively.178
It is predicted that these additional requirements will also carry
some negative impact on return on equity. The widely publicized study
by The Clearinghouse Association, the nation's oldest banking trade
group, estimates that the "cumulative impact of the Basel III minimum
capital requirement and [systemic institution] surcharges would
decrease bank return on equity by up to 4.9 percentage points." 79 Such
an impact would decrease investor appetite for bank equity and reduce
the size of banks' balance sheets.
In sum, while Skeel's doubts regarding the ability of regulators
to fulfill Dodd-Frank's directives on certain issues are merited, efforts
to strengthen capital requirements have remained a priority for reform'8 0
and have progressed significantly through the creation of new
international standards. These new standards will not only be
(Supp. IV 2010).
176. Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirement for Covered
Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 594, 596 (Jan. 5, 2012).
177. John McDermott, The Cost of Being a Global SIFI, FIN. TIMES ALPHAVILLE BLOG
(Jul. 13, 2011, 9:06 PM), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2011/07/13/621636/the-cost-of-
being-a-global-sifi.
178. Id
179. THE CLEARING HOUSE Assoc'N, supra note 164.
180. See The Changing Role of the FDIC: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on TARP, Fin.
Servs., and Bailouts of Pub. and Private Programs of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't
Reform, 112th Cong. 11 (2011), available at
http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Testimony/BairTestimony.pdf (statement of
Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.) ("The single most important element of a
strong and stable banking system is its capital base . . . . Supervisory processes will always
lag innovation and risk-taking to some extent, and restrictions on activities can be difficult
to define and enforce. Hard and fast objective capital standards ... are easier for
supervisors to enforce, and provide an additional cushion of loss absorbency when mistakes
are made . . . ").
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sufficiently robust to offset some of the competitive advantages that
larger banks currently enjoy, they will do so by forcing them to embrace
a more conservative balance sheet. To suggest, as Skeel does, that the
financial lobby will overrun policymakers on the issue of new capital
requirements is excessively pessimistic.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, The New Financial Deal provides both a
thoughtful overview and critique of Dodd-Frank and suggests different
ways in which the legislation could be improved. As a bankruptcy
scholar, Skeel understandably adopts a bankruptcy-centric approach to
financial regulatory reform that is as creative as it is persuasive.
Although Skeel is overly pessimistic concerning the ability of regulators
to effectively implement one of Dodd-Frank's most critical reforms, he
has written a remarkably engaging study of Dodd-Frank and the future
of financial services regulation in the United States.
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